The Myanmar military junta concluded its controversial three–phase election, with the final round of voting held on January 25, 2026, across remaining townships. The process which began on December 28, 2025, was internationally condemned as a sham orchestrated to entrench military rule under a democratic facade rather than restore genuine civilian governance. After multiple delays, the regime framed the staggered vote as a path to stability, while conducted it in phases across junta-controlled areas, excluding conflict zones. The election excluded major opposition parties, featured widespread boycotts, voter intimidation and coercion resulting in extremely low turnout in many areas.
Sham election outcomes
Junta’s long delay multi-phase election held from late December 2025 to January 25, 2026 has concluded with a predictable wining for its proxy party the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP). Sham and staged process the polls excluded major opposition parties like the dissolved National Leage for Democracy occurred amid ongoing civil war with no voting in large conflict zones, and featured widespread intimidation banned critics and jailed political opponents.
The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) dominated results across all phases, securing a majority through uncontested seats, advance ballots and the absence of credible rivals. The USDP exceeding 80% in contested areas reflect support primarily from junta allies and military-affiliated voters rather than broad public endorsement.
On the day of the final voting round junta leader Min Aung Hlaing dismissed international criticism of the polls as “not my concern.” In statements to Myanmar state affiliated media and during public appearances, he emphasized that the election results would form the new government. He vowed to “work hard to get a better situation” and continue efforts toward stability, signalling that his military administration intends to maintain control indefinitely. These remarks indicate that Ming Aung Hlaing is potentially positioning himself for the presidency and views the voting not as a transition to civilian rule but as a mechanism to legitimise and perpetuate the junta’s grip on power.
This outcome aligns with the regime’s broader strategy – bolstering domestic consolidation while seeking regional validation from ASEAN to regain access to high-level meetings and gradually chipping away international isolation for recognition as a “legitimate” elected government. However, the low turnout, the exclusion of opposition, and ongoing violence undermine any claims of legitimacy.
ASEAN has refused to send observers or endorse the results, stressing the need for inclusivity per its 5 Point Consensus. Malaysia has reiterated its stance against certification, while the Philippines, the incoming 2026 ASEAN chair, has engaged cautiously with its special envoy, holding dialogues with both the junta and opposition groups without endorsing the process. The election occurs amid escalating atrocities with the junta intensifying airstrikes on civilians’ schools, hospitals, and areas supporting democratic forces like Ethnic resistance Organisations and People Defence Forces (PDF) in direct violation of its 2021. Brunei pledges for peace. As the coup’s fifth anniversary nears on Feb 1st, 2026, the military shows no shift toward genuine dialogue prioritising power retention over reconciliation.
Compounding these issues is the ongoing International Court of Justice (ICJ) hearing on genocide allegations related to the Rohingya crisis which could deliver a ruling later this year.
Australia continues to lead calls for stronger action having sanctioned junta linked entities and jet fuel suppliers.
Need for stronger sanctions
The Myanmar Campaign Network (MCN), a coalition of Australian civil society, trade unions, and diaspora groups, urges even tougher targeted sanctions on state-owned enterprises, banks arms, suppliers’ aviation chains, and revenue sources like gems and mining.
The network also presses Australia to advocate for full enforcement of ILO Article 33, invoked in June 2025 against the junta for grave violations of workers’ rights, including forced labour, torture and detention of at least 69 trade unionists, many tortured in military prisons alongside widespread persecution of journalists.
Myanmar’s crisis extends beyond internal politics, fuelled by junta protected online scam hubs that victimise Australians and generate billions for the regime.
With over 20 million in humanitarian need and violence unrelenting the concluded election risks deepening division rather than resolving conflict. For the junta, the ballot has served as a tool for survival. For the international community, it remains a stark test of commitment to accountability and human rights.